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than would be imposed by employers as a disciplinary sanction.
We also cautiously affirm the role of delay in reducing a grievant's
chance of reinstatement.
On the other hand, our data give reason to question the assumption that arbitrators typically retain jurisdiction when they issue
back pay awards. We observe the Seven Tests being far less influential in actual assessment ofjust cause than the literature would suggest. Our results also indicate that arbitrators invoke heightened
proof requirements, such as "clear and convincing evidence" and
:•beyond a reasonable doubt" much less frequently than claimed
m the literature or found by prior studies, even in cases where
employees have been charged with criminal conduct.
This presentation is the beginning of our efforts to draw from
our newly compiled data set the most empirically valid picture of
the nature of decisionmaking in discipline and discharge labor
~rbitration yet attempted. We plan to continue these explorations
ma future book and subsequent articles that will also include the
application of more sophisticated statistical techniques.

II. How AND WHY LABOR ARBITRATORS DECIDE
DISCIPLINE AND DISCHARGE CASES: AN EMPIRICAL
EXMINATION-COMMENTS
THEODORE]. ST. ANTOINE*

Laura Cooper, Mike Bognanno, and Steve Befort ( CBB) have
made a major contribution to our understanding of the decisional process in the arbitration of discipline and discharge cases.
Nels Nelson has carefully examined their methodology and the
reasons their study holds so much greater potential for drawing
sound conclusions than previous efforts based on considerably
more limited data bases. My comments will deal with a particular
theme that runs through the study: the extent to which it confirms
or challenges a number of the generalizations about arbitrators'
views set forth in the NAA's The Common Law of the Workplace, published in 1998 and revised in 2005. 1
*Member, National Academy of Arbitrators, Degan Professor Emeritus of Law,
University of Michigan.
1
St. Antoine, ed., The Common Law of the Workplace: The Views of Arbitrators, 2d
ed. (BNA Books 2005).
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Let me first say a word about the origins, philosophy, and
modus operandi of The Common Law, because I think they say a lot
about the credibility of the resulting product. The work was the
brainchild of Arnold Zack, Academy President in 1994-95, with
his principal co-conspirators being his successor Presidents, Ted
Weatherill and George Nicolau. The Common Law was designed to
commemorate the 50th Anniversary of the NAA in 1997 by summing up some of the leading arbitral principles developed over its
first half century. Many veteran arbitrators rarely published their
decisions and media attention often focused on the sensational
case rather than the more typical. Although there had been good
encyclopedic treatments, it was felt that a fairly short, authoritative overview would be more useful to the less experienced arbitrator or advocate.
Arnie caught me in a weak moment, enjoying a light teaching
load while visiting at Cambridge University, and I agreed to be editor of the volume. We next rounded up 15 star performers among
Academy members to do the hard job of writing on everything
from arbitral practice and procedure to remedies in arbitration.
And then, in a move I considered very important, we enlisted the
aid of an advisory group of eight former Academy Presidents,
chaired by Dick Mittenthal. They went over at least one chapter
each, and did not hesitate to criticize and suggest improvements.
The 15 writers and I engaged in numerous debates over drafts
covering the more sensitive areas. Selected portions of early drafts
dealing with some of the most controversial issues were placed
before the entire membership attending three different general
meetings as well as some of the regional meetings of the Academy. When there was respectable support for different positions
on certain issues, we would include the various points of view. The
upshot, I believe, reflected arbitral thinking in the United States
and Canada as accurately as could be ascertained in the judgment
of a highly able and experienced group of arbitrators. But, of
course, it did not constitute the sort of actual head count we have
before us today.
What, then, do the comparisons have to tell us? As might be
expected, the empirical study supported the validity of a number
of the generalizations contained in The Common Law. Thus, as
seen in decisions reducing employer discipline, "most" arbitrators
do adopt the principle of progressive discipline, even though a
particular collective bargaining agreement may say nothing about
the subject. Not surprisingly, arbitrators "generally" enforce last-
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chance agreements. On the famous (or infamous) Seven Tests of
Arbitrator Carroll Daugherty for ''.just cause," CBB report that in
only about 9 percent of the decisions they studied did arbitrators
rely on them. The Common Law concedes that the Seven Tests have
been "influential," but cites a "critically convincing" alternative
view by Professor John Dunsford. Naturally, the areas I find most
interesting are those in which the empirical study seems to refute
the positions taken by The Common Law.
For example, there may be a conflict concerning the retention
of jurisdiction when the arbitrator determines that back pay is
appropriate and remands the case to the parties to compute it.
The Common Law states: "Such a remedy is usually, but not always,
accompanied by a retention of jurisdiction by the arbitrator in
the event that there is a subsequent dispute over the amount"
(emphasis added). The CBB empirical study indicated that in 432
cases where the employee was reinstated with full or partial back
pay, the arbitrator did not retain jurisdiction about 73 percent of
the time. But the precise question asked of the data was whether
the arbitrator "expressly" retained jurisdiction to resolve any subsequent disputes. That is a big difference. Although I invariably
retainjurisdiction in such situations in an ad hoc appointment, I
do not feel any such need when I am handling a case as a permanent arbitrator or as a member of a board of arbitrators. There
the understanding of everyone is that the issue will come back for
a final ruling if the parties are not able to resolve it. In addition,
an entirely plausible argument can be made that an award that
provides for back pay but does not compute it and does not deal
with such natural additional questions as mitigation of damages
is actually an interim award, and must be regarded as implicitly
retaining jurisdiction if the award is not to be treated as defective
for lack of completeness and finality. At any rate, I think it deserves
further inquiry whether, at least in such a common situation as the
resolution of computation issues in back pay cases, the arbitrator
and the parties assume that retention of remedial jurisdiction is
implicit. Incidentally, at the Academy's Business Meeting today a
motion was adopted to modify the Code of Professional Responsibility to permit an arbitrator to retain remedial jurisdiction even
over the objection of one of the parties.
The question of the quantum of proof required in discipline
and discharge cases is another area in which the generalizations
of The Common Law may be at odds with the findings of the CBB
empirical study. I should first note that this does not involve the
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quite distinct issue of the burden of proof. As CBB observe, it seems
universally accepted, at least in labor arbitration (nonunion
employment arbitration may vary, depending on the particular
contract), that the employer bears the burden of proving there
was just cause or good cause for the discharge or other discipline
imposed. But on the quantum, or amount, of proof needed, there
is a wide range of views.
Section 6.10 of The Common Law, covering quantum of proof,
was hammered out after considerable discussion among the
work's authors and editors. It reads essentially as follows (emphasis supplied):
(1) For most arbitrators, the normal quantum of proof required
in disciplinary cases is "preponderance of the evidence."
For a minority, it is "clear and convincing evidence."
(2) When the employee's alleged offense would constitute a
serious breach of the law or would be viewed as moral turpitude ... , most arbitrators require ... "clear and convincing
evidence." Some require proof"beyond a reasonable doubt"
but ... most hold that the criminal-law standard ... has no
place in ... arbitration.
The Common Law adds: "Some arbitrators reject the very idea of a
quantum of proof as a distracting legalism. Others argue that it is
impossible to avoid at least an implicit quantum requirement."
The CBB empirical study stated that in the whole body of 2,055
discipline cases, 78 percent of the arbitrators did not specify a
quantum of proof and so the authors assumed a "preponderance
of the evidence" standard. Only 10 percent said "clear and convincing" and fewer than 2 percent said "beyond a reasonable doubt."
That validated The Common Law's conclusion as to discipline cases
generally. When it came to 1,034 cases involving possible crimes
or matters of moral turpitude, however, the empirical study apparently disputed the assertions of The Common Law. Here CBB found
that 84 percent still applied the preponderance standard, while
only 13 percent required clear and convincing evidence and a
mere 3 percent insisted on proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Even in the 97 cases where a crime had actually been charged in
the criminal justice system, the figures changed only modestly to
about 76, 16, and 8 percent, respectively.
The first reaction, regrettably, has to be that my learned colleagues and I, who put The Common Law together, were simply
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wrong, and that any future editions will have to be revised accordingly. The conclusion would thus be that the majority view is that
the "preponderance of the evidence" standard prevails in all discipline and discharge cases, even those involving possible crimes
or matters implicating moral turpitude. Of course, such an admission is to be made, and such a conclusion is to be accepted, only
as a last resort. But seriously, I do believe that one underlying
assumption in the CBB analysis must be probed before The Common Law throws in the towel. As the authors state it: "[W] e are
assuming that an unstated quantum of proof is equivalent to a
~tated standard of 'preponderance of the evidence.'" That surely
1s not self-evident.
One of the oldest and most systematic of labor arbitration systems is the Board of Arbitration established by U.S. Steel and the
Steelworkers, and chaired over the years by such luminaries as Sylvester Garrett, Al Dybeck, and now Shyam Das. The Board has
strenuously resisted ever articulating exactly what is its quantumof-proof standard. Decisions will simply say that that the Board is
'.'convinced," "persuaded," or "satisfied," or use similar language
In reaching a result. Does that mean that the same quantum is
required when employees have been charged with theft, and their
~eputations in the community and their likely future employabil~ty are at stake, as when they are charged with excessive absenteeism? I cannot answer that question with any certainty, either for
the Board of Arbitration or for all the other arbitrators who do
not spell out precisely the standard that they are applying in such
discipline and discharge cases. But, it really must be answered
one way or another, if The Common Law formulation is to retain
its present specificity. Perhaps a future edition will have to hedge,
however, saying "some" arbitrators do this and "others" do that. In
any event, I am one of those who believe that there must be some
implicit standard even when none is articulated. Implicitly there
could be the same "preponderance of the evidence" standard in
all cases, or there could be the more demanding "clear and convincing" standard in charges of moral turpitude.
Two other factors may be at work, age and geography. I like to
think that the authors and editors of The Common Law were a reasonably distinguished lot. But in a field like ours, distinction tends
to come at a price-years in service, and gray hairs. That would
be especially true of our Presidential Advisory Group. So, it is possible that some of the ideas and positions set forth in The Common
Law reflected the thinking of a somewhat older generation than
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would be true of the more heterogeneous group of 81 arbitrators
who decided all the cases submitted to the Minnesota Bureau of
Mediation Services since the early 1980s. Part of the trend toward
the "legalization" of the arbitration process that we see as a departure from former practices unique to arbitration may include a
willingness to adopt more of the standards of the civil courts. That
could include heavier reliance by younger or newer arbitrators
on the courts' single quantum of proof in civil cases, namely, a
preponderance of the evidence, rather than the more specialized
approach of veteran arbitrators in requiring a higher standard
of clear and convincing proof when an employee is charged with
conduct involving moral turpitude. There may well be other generational implications going well beyond quantum of proof that
would be worth searching out in this empirical study.
In assessing the CBB study, another factor that may need more
investigation is simply geographical, to determine whether Minnesota is a fair reflection of the country as a whole. Here I am
not thinking specifically of quantum of proof-no reason immediately occurs to me why attitudes on that should vary from region
to region. The Minnesota data have the advantage over published
decisions that they are nearly all-encompassing for their time
period and are not dependent on the subjective selection process
of some editorial board. But I do have the impression that in some
ways relations between employers and unions are more relaxeddare I say "kinder, gentler"?-in the Midwest generally, and in
Minnesota specifically, than in some other parts of the country.
What would be the reaction, for example, to an employer's calling the grievant as its first witness in a disciplinary case? There is
certainly a logical basis for such a move-in John Kagel's colorful
phrase, employers are simply trying to "nail the jelly to the tree"to put grievants on record before they have heard the testimony
of other witnesses and can adjust their stories accordingly. And,
of course, there is, strictly speaking, no First Amendment right
of silence in a private arbitration. But, for many persons it goes
against the grain to let the employer, which has the burden of
proof in a discipline case, start making its case out of the grievant's
own mouth. Might arbitral attitudes on that and other matters
differ from one section of the country to another? So I am not yet
prepared to accept the CBB sample as necessarily universal in its
application. But, at the very least, it is a goldmine of worthwhile
data, and we are all much indebted to its intrepid excavators.

